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 12  Minority (Serb)  Returnees  to Croatia  
 Reintegration or New Immigration? 
 Milan  Mesic 8 and  Dragan   Bagic 8
  Traditional Understanding of Refugee 
Return to Their Homes 
 Studying small and (relatively) closed communities, traditional anthro-
pology and ethnology have contributed to conceptualizing an essential-
ized connection between man and space. From this perspective, human 
beings, i.e., human groups, feel “naturally” attached to the place (in the 
territorial sense) of their residence, which primarily refers to the place 
of birth, their native region, and/ or homeland. The notion that people 
are “beings of place” 1 is often refl ected in botanical metaphors, and we 
say that someone is “rooted” in a place, or “uprooted” when this place 
is abandoned. 2 
 George Gmelch generally defi nes return migration as “the movement 
of emigrants back to their homeland to resettle,” 3 depicting it thus as the 
(fi nal) ending to the migration movement. Although it is reasonable to 
assume that the  return of refugees is often signifi cantly different from 
the return of voluntary emigrants, the advocates of repatriation basi-
cally developed a theory that all  refugees (normally) favor repatriation, 4 
which they consider the best durable solution to the refugee exodus. 5 In 
the international discourse of repatriation, return is depicted within an 
essentialized concept, according to which  refugees return to their “natu-
ral” homes 6  – a concept which is based on an idealized image of pre- war 
(local) life. If home is the “center of the world,” then the loss of home is 
the “undoing of the meaning of the world.” 7 
 In short, refugee return has traditionally been viewed as a single and 
unique act. Furthermore, it implies a happy ending to the refugee cycle, 
and as a durable solution, it releases the responsible international organi-
zations from further care for former refugees. While the status of a refugee 
is associated with negative connotations of a victim – suffering, “uproot-
ing,” loss of “home” – or in short social pathology, return is perceived as 
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the opposite of it all. It represents something good that is fi nally happen-
ing (again) to the refugees, a kind of “natural” renewal of their original 
life. The right of displaced persons to return to their “homes of origin,” at 
least regarding this region, received great support from the “international 
community.” If basic prerequisites for the return are acquired, and if it 
becomes desirable from the standpoint of the international community, 
the non- return option chosen by the refugees themselves is perceived as 
“not normal” and their status as “ non- returnees” pathological. 8 This is 
based on the standpoint that, by returning, refugees lose their refugee 
label, and become “normal” people who, as everyone else, again belong 
to their “home” and “homeland.” 9 It is only by means of return that the 
“natural” and “national” order, which is assumed to have existed before 
the displacement, can be re- established. 10 
 In this chapter, we would like to identify key political, economic, 
socio- demographic, cultural, and other changes in Croatia, which affect 
the  return of Serb refugees to their places of origin. It is relevant both 
socially and academically to explain the major reasons for a drastic reduc-
tion of the ethnic Serb minority in the total population of the country 
(from 12.2 percent in 1991 to 4.4 percent in 2011). In the social- political 
sense, reintegration of the  Serb returnees has remained one of the critical 
issues in the democratic constitution of the new Croatian society. As to 
refugee studies and policies, we call into question some well- established 
traditional views concerning the “natural” aspirations of refugees to 
return to their homelands and homes, once their security is guaranteed. 
  Criticism of the Traditional Understanding of 
(Minority) Refugee Return 
 Unfortunately, it turned out that the “international community” 
assumed, in a facile way, that most refugees and internally displaced 
persons would want to return to their pre- war homes (especially in 
Bosnia- Herzegovina, and then in Croatia and Kosovo). This did not 
happen, however, because a large number of  minority refugees and 
displaced persons were not willing to return for good to their homes 
due to radically changed circumstances in their immediate and wider 
environment, whether for the short term and/ or for the medium term. 
 Monitoring of  returnees soon “revealed” a worrying trend that many 
of them, sooner or later, and for different reasons, migrate again. Many 
requested and returned houses have been sold, replaced, rented, or 
remained empty. Thus, the vast majority of  minority returnees 11 con-
sist of elderly people who return to peripheral, rural places of origin, 
where they can rely on a small state pension and agriculture for their 
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needs. 12  Barbara Harrell- Bond 13 was among the fi rst to question the 
wish of refugees to return home. Even if they return, for some of them 
it does not necessarily signify the end of the refugee experience. 14 In 
many cases, returning does not improve the living conditions of per-
sons who used to be refugees, and consequently returnees, for various 
reasons, have to move again. 
 Therefore, the traditional notion of return, as well as home, has 
recently been subjected to severe criticism from  migration and refugee 
theorists and researchers. A deeper insight into the motives of refugees 
would show that some of them, for various reasons (time spent in the 
refuge, security, economic and political conditions in the country), are 
not prone to repatriation (particularly if they sought refuge in a devel-
oped country, or a country of their ethnic group). They decide to return 
if they fi nd other durable solutions less feasible. Primarily politicized 
groups of refugees tend to refuse return as a solution to their refugee 
status. Indeed, the  refugees “may be associated with previous regimes 
and attached to former ethnic and political elite structures, and thus be 
subject to hostility and jealousy” once they return 15 . 
 Recent studies on return (including our own) 16 show that return does 
not always ensure a “natural” reincorporation of returnees into the  soci-
ety of origin, but rather that those who return to their homes often fi nd 
them signifi cantly different, changed, both physically and socially, and 
that they need to negotiate their re- settlement in a very different context 
of power and inequality. 17 Jansen and Löfving 18 demonstrate that, after 
violence and destruction, re- emplacement should be viewed in the con-
text of economic and political changes. Such large- scale perturbations 
intersect with changes in individual and social trajectories. 19 In other 
words, the process of return affects all dimensions of life, and is infl u-
enced by a wide range of individual, contextual, and psychosocial fac-
tors. 20 This does not mean that  returnees cannot be moved by a strong 
feeling of attachment to their place of origin. However, we would like to 
point out that the feelings of belonging and attachment to a place (home) 
should be perceived in connection with broader social and historical pro-
cesses which provide the basis for people to have demands from a certain 
place and call it their home. 21 
 There was an attempt to explain the slow progress in increasing the 
number of  minority returnees by insuffi cient security conditions and 
violation of human and refugee rights. Unfortunately, this was more 
or less true, but the causes of minority non- return, as shown by more 
comprehensive analyses, were deeper and broader, including social and 
economic conditions. Indeed, new patterns of exclusion in the  society of 
origin emerged with new status hierarchies. Each individual is faced with 
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making his or her own decision (affecting other family members too), 
taking into account a mix of reasons. 22 
 Recent research has shown that return is ambivalent in the fi rst and 
subsequent generations of both voluntary and  involuntary migrants. 
Return migration is often not a simple movement and not a fi nal act. 
Exploring the return of  Croatian immigrants of various generations 
and demographic profi les, Jasna C 0apo Žmegac \23 concluded that return 
migrations can be better understood as a type of immigration, as it seems 
that there is no justifi cation for the traditional conceptual differentiation 
between immigration and return. Therefore, return is today conceived in 
much broader terms – as a stage within a fl uid migration cycle of spatial 
mobility. 24 
 It seems that within a short time the understanding of return as a com-
plex, long- term, and multi- directional process prevailed. Experiences 
of past return operations have shown that, in reality, return and re- 
integration do not occur as a “natural” act, and they do not take place 
in continuity and without obstacles, especially in post- confl ict situations, 
but rather represent complex processes prone to changes in line with 
local circumstances. 25 In the cases of Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina, 
and actually, more or less in all  post- confl ict societies, return and rein-
tegration take place in the context of deep changes, including the tran-
sition to new economic and political systems. “From a perspective of 
the  returnees, therefore, return and reintegration is a dynamic and con-
tested process which means to negotiate one’s position in a new context 
of power and inequality.” 26 
 Studies have also revealed that the terms “home” and “return to 
home,” on which repatriation endeavors are based, do not always have 
the same meaning for the  refugees, i.e., the returnees themselves. In 
practice, most (Bosniak)  returnees experience return with a basic feeling 
of ambivalence. On the one hand, they have re- possessed their “small 
home,” on the other hand, their “large home” seems to be forever lost. 27 
 Tania Ghanem 28 noted the paradox of refugee return: “How can it be 
assumed that refugees are returning ‘home’ when the very reasons they 
left were that they did not feel ‘at home’ anymore?” 
 In the late 1990s, the idea that return would provide fulfi llment, an 
ending to a cycle, allowing the refugee to re- establish the pre- exile cir-
cumstances of his or her “home,” was called into question.  Surveys of 
 refugees who went “home” highlighted the complexity of their experi-
ences, marked with economic, psychological, and social diffi culties. 29 
One started to re- examine what was previously a basic assumption made 
by international and other parties interested in the return of  involun-
tary migrants – the assumption that the returnees simply “return home.” 
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“The reality is much more complex, and is often related to the changed 
identity of the  migrant and the changed context in the home country. 
Returning to a changed country, where  social relations, political struc-
tures and economic conditions are not what they used to be, may be 
equivalent to arriving in a new place.” 30 
 According to this new understanding, “home” is not a physical place 
but a combination of  social relations and cultural meanings. 31 Moreover, 
the very concept of “home” is transformed in a  war.  Returnees are often 
faced with a “home” which has changed substantially over the time of 
their absence, and now claim the diffi cult process of integration into a 
new society. Rather than simply considering return migration as “going 
home,” it should be viewed as an intrinsically transnational phenom-
enon, as it takes place across national state borders. 32 Return can be 
better conceptualized as an open- ended process, which often takes place 
over a longer time period and may include phases of dual residency and 
signifi cant movement between the two residences. 
  Changed Social Context for  Minority Returnees 
 In any country, confl icts, especially on ethnic or religious grounds, lead 
to deep and far- reaching social consequences, particularly regarding 
the relationship between the warring (ethnic) groups. This is clearly the 
case with  the confl icts in  Croatia and Bosnia- Herzegovina. They them-
selves were an expression of irreconcilable political and national inter-
ests in the processes of the collapse of the multi- ethnic Yugoslav Socialist 
Federation, which led to mass killings, concentration camps, and rape, in 
short all kinds of ( war) crimes, mainly against the civilian population. All 
this insanity was driven by one strategically “rational” political goal: the 
 ethnic cleansing of undesirable people of different nationality or ethnic-
ity. 33 The result was the most massive ethnic refugee fl ows in Europe 
since  World War Two. 34 Simultaneous with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
new national states were created out of its previous constitutive repub-
lics, and the political and economic order was changed (from a one- party 
socialist to a multi- party capitalist one). 
 In this chapter, we want to point out that the academic debates and 
public policies on the  return of Serb 35 refugees to Croatia, both at the 
national and the international level, have taken insuffi cient account of 
all of the new circumstances. According to recent scientifi c studies and 
discussions, as well as the results of our research, the circumstances have 
a largely negative impact on the willingness of a large part of  refugees, 
especially younger, educated, and urban, to return. Here we highlight the 
socio- demographic, political, economic, cultural, and linguistic changes 
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in Croatian society since Croatia declared its independence, and even-
tually the personal changes that  refugees experienced in the process of 
their  involuntary migration, which all, more or less, have  affected Serb 
returnees (including potential ones). 
  Socio- demographic Changes 
 Mass, mostly forced,  migration in Croatia in the 1990s occurred in two 
major fl ows, primarily in parts of Croatia which were directly affected 
by military operations. The fi rst refers to the expulsion and exodus of 
 ethnic Croats and other  non- Serb ethnic groups from areas in Croatia 
which, with the help of the Yugoslav army, were conquered by  rebel 
Serbs. The Serb insurrections proclaimed these areas of the Croatian 
state territory as the Serb Autonomous Region (SAO Krajina). 36 Later, 
in connection with the Croatian liberation operations Flash and Storm, 37 
these parts witnessed an exodus of most of their Serb population. Thus, 
the whole area was in fact emptied of its population, which before the 
war accounted for approximately 550,000 people in total. The region of 
eastern Slavonia underwent a somewhat different pattern of  migration, 
but also fell temporarily under the authority of  rebel Serbs in Croatia. 
However, although it was restored to the constitutional and juridical 
order of  Croatia during the process of peaceful reintegration, a large 
number of Serbs have remained there, and some of them were moved 
there previously from other Serb regions. 
 The return of displaced persons (Croats) and  refugees (Serbs) was 
carried out in two main fl ows. First, displaced persons of Croatian 
nationality returned, while the basic conditions for the return of  ethnic 
Serbs were provided a little later, in the late 1990s. According to offi -
cial data of the Croatian government, approximately 109,000 displaced 
persons returned to the former war zone by the middle of 1998, mainly 
Croats who had been forced by rebel Serb authorities to fl ee their homes 
and areas. This accounted for most of the approximately 127,000 dis-
placed persons registered at the beginning of 1995. However, probably 
a signifi cant part of that offi cial return was only a formal and not an 
actual act of returning. The offi cial registration of return included, thus, 
the process of reconstruction of houses and acquisition of other mate-
rial rights. Because of that, all members of the household registered as 
 returnees, although in fact only part of the (elderly) household members 
returned. In our research, we found an even greater disparity between 
the actual return and the formal registration of  Serb returnees. It turned 
out that just over one third (about 45,000) of offi cially  registered return-
ees (133,000) actually lived in Croatia at the end of 2010. 38 
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 Croatian population censuses from 2001 and 2011 show the effects of 
a lasting decrease in the population in those areas in Croatia which had 
been affected by  war. In the six counties from which a relatively major 
part of the Serbs fl ed, there was a drastic decline in the total popula-
tion between the census in 1991 and the census in 2001. 39 The latter 
census registered a total population of 246,000 fewer people than had 
been registered a decade earlier. In the fi rst of the observed decades, the 
number of people living in this area was reduced by a quarter, and in 
the next by a further 5 percent. 40 Taking into account that these coun-
ties include areas which were not under the authority of  rebel Serbs, 
and several towns whose population number has remained stable or even 
increased, 41 the actual extent of the depopulation of the returnee areas 
is much higher. This is best exemplifi ed by the Lic \ko- Senjska County, 
which was completely affected by the  war. In the period between 1991 
and 2001 it lost 37 percent of its population, and in the next decade this 
fi gure rose to more than 40 percent (see  Figure 12.1 ). The loss of popu-
lation in these areas was far greater  in rural areas. 
 The dramatically reduced number of people who today actually live 
in the returnee areas in Croatia affects  returnees in several ways. First 
of all, it makes it diffi cult for them to restore previous social networks 
and establish new ones. There are no longer, as in the old days, numer-
ous cousins, godparents, friends, and acquaintances on whom  returnees 
can rely to overcome the complex conditions of return. This was con-
fi rmed by the respondents in our survey, more than 70 percent of whom 
indicated that nobody or only a small number of their relatives, pre- war 
neighbors, and friends had returned to Croatia. 43 Because of that, these 
people must feel lonely and isolated, particularly in the small, remote, 
and scattered villages and hamlets to which  a large number of  elderly 
returned. It is undoubtedly an emotional and social loss for them, with 
practical consequences for everyday life in which people, especially the 
elderly, should have a mutual help network, not to mention initiatives to 
improve life in the local community. 
 As we have already noted,  refugee migrations in Croatia have led to 
a dramatic recomposition in the ethnic structure (including a decline 
of ethnic Serbs from 12.2 percent to 4.4 percent). In this connection, 
the decrease in the Serb population is signifi cantly higher in the listed 
six counties than the average for the whole country. In 1991, 288,000 
ethnic Serbs lived in these counties and accounted for 30 percent of their 
total population, while in 2001 only 65,600 (8.8  percent) were regis-
tered (see  Figure 12.2 ). Meanwhile, the immigration of  numerous ethnic 
Croats from Bosnia- Herzegovina, who came to inhabit the places from 
which  Serbs had fl ed, represents a signifi cant change, especially in some 
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municipalities and towns. According to the 2001 census, about 61,600 of 
these immigrants lived in the same counties (on average 8.3 percent, and 
relatively most of them in Požeška- slavonska County – 13.3 percent) (see 
 Figure 12.3 ). When  Croatian immigrants from Kosovo and some parts 
of Serbia are added to this number, we get about 10 percent  Croatian 
immigrants, and their concentration is the greatest in towns and munici-
palities of  Serb refugees. In this way not only was the ethnic composition 
of the population of that area greatly altered, but these settlers brought 
somewhat different cultural traditions in comparison with those of both 
domiciled Croats and domiciled Serbs. The research of return to Petrinja 
has shown that for  Serb returnees this represents another adjustment, 44 
 as testifi ed by our respondents. 
100%0%
 Figure 12.1  Decrease of total number of inhabitants in the percentages 
on the county level between the 1991 and 2001 population censuses 42 
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  New Political System 
 By all accounts, political changes, which were initiated by the introduc-
tion of  multi- party elections, affected mostly a large portion of  Serb refu-
gees, mostly from rebellious Croatian areas previously populated by an 
 ethnic Serb majority (absolute or relative). The introduction of  multi- 
party elections and the independence of the  Republic of Croatia (and 
later Bosnia- Herzegovina) represented a major obstacle to the move-
ment for Great Serbia aimed at  reconstituting Yugoslavia as a unitary 
or at least predominantly Serb state. A large proportion of the Croatian 
Serb population in areas where they were an absolute or relative majority 
were also mobilized for the “Greater Serbia” project, as evidenced by the 
Šibensko-kninska County
Zadarska County
Požeško-slavonska
County
Sisacˇko-moslavacˇka
County
Karlovacˇka County
0%–25%
Licˇko-senjska County
 Figure 12.2  Share of  ethnic Serbs in total population by municipalities 
according to the 1991 population census 
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key (irredentist) slogan at mass rallies in these parts: “This is Serbia!” At 
the same time, Croatian nationalist forces provoked fear and resistance 
among Serbs in Croatia, led by the winning party in the 1991  democratic 
elections, the  Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajed-
nica – HDZ), which in the decade that followed became the undisputed 
political arbiter in the country. 
 It seems that a substantial number of  Croatian Serbs did not perceive 
the multi- party  democratic elections as a political system of competing for 
power and its regular shift. They viewed it primarily as the establishment 
of an anti- Serb regime, i.e., as the actual power of a dominant nation-
alist Croatian party ( HDZ), which won democratic legitimacy, while 
hardly any other different political party could have won the elections. 
0%–70%
 Figure 12.3  Decrease in the percentage of ethnic Serbs on the munici-
pality level between the 1991 and 2001 population censuses 
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Simultaneously,  Miloševic 8’s propaganda machine in Belgrade deepened 
and spread fear among Serbs in Croatia, claiming that the new Croatian 
state was the successor state of the  collaborationist fascist regime in the 
Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska  – NDH), 
staged during the  Second World War and responsible for mass killings of 
Serbs, Jews,  Roma, and Croatian anti- fascists. Distrust of Serbs toward 
political changes in Croatia was strengthened by the fact that the HDZ 
government under President Franjo Tudjman used some symbols and 
terminology which the NDH had also used (from the public adminis-
tration and administrative units, including the army and police, to the 
monetary unit), 45 and was more than tolerant toward extreme right- wing 
public behavior. Eventually, the revision of historical and other textbooks 
followed. 
 In addition, Serbs in Croatia lost their special status of a semi- 
constitutive people, defi ned by the Constitution of the Socialist Republic 
of Croatia as “Serbs in Croatia,” and are now equal to other  national 
minorities. They were right in claiming that in the Socialist Republic of 
Croatia they did not have pure minority status (which was partly true 
for other minorities too, defi ned as “nationalities” rather than “ national 
minorities”). It was a special, juridically vague, semi- constitutive yet not 
fully state- constitutive status. Yet, they were not put on equal footing 
with  Croats in regard to Croatian statehood. Otherwise, socialist Croatia 
would itself have been federated. In any case, these political changes 
helped counter- political mobilization of the  Croatian Serbs. 
 However, the special and diffi cult position of Serbs, especially  return-
ees, stems not so much from the fact that almost two- thirds of their 
ethnic body left Croatia (permanently), and that they are equal to other 
ethnic minorities (none of the twenty- two recognized minorities makes 
up even 1 percent of the total population), but rather from their rebellion 
and the ethnic and  religious confl ict with Croats, as the state- constitutive 
majority. Second, their neighboring kin state openly, and through mil-
itary means, supported Croatian Serbs’ irredentist aspirations. Third, 
the Croat majority has blamed Serbs in Croatia for hampering Croatian 
national development in both Yugoslav states (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
and the Socialist Federated Republic of  Yugoslavia) and the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire. In  Croatia and elsewhere in  Eastern Europe, minor-
ities are seen as former agents of oppressive imperial policies (imperial 
minorities), under which the present national majorities suffered and 
were not able to realize their national states. 46 For this reason, nation-
alist rhetoric easily mobilizes anti- minority sentiments among majority 
peoples. 47 Finally, the  rebel Serbs lost the democratic legitimacy for their 
demands for autonomy, because of the illiberal and undemocratic way 
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in which they went about establishing their self- proclaimed autonomy in 
the early 1990s, utilizing military force to drive out indigenous Croats. 
They implemented a brutal policy of  ethnic cleansing, intimidation, and 
deprivation of rights of the local non- Serb population ( Croats and oth-
ers). Furthermore, they suffocated any resistance to such a policy within 
the  Serb community itself, and thus evidently demonstrated internal 
illiberalism, in fact an anti- democratic orientation. 48 
 It seems that a large number of Serbs have not, to this date, made 
peace with their minority status, although in the meantime the system 
of protection of their minority political and cultural rights has developed 
signifi cantly and reached a high standard, at least on a formal level. 49 Our 
research indicates that two- thirds of returnee respondents believe that 
Serbs should not have the status of a national minority but of a constitu-
ent people. Slightly less than half (42 percent) of them are not satisfi ed 
with their political rights (regardless of the extent to which they are really 
familiar with them), and more than a third (36 percent) say that they feel 
like second- rate citizens. 50 We can, with high probability, assume that 
negative attitudes about the position of Serbs in Croatia today are even 
more pronounced among  Serb refugees who do not wish to return to 
Croatia. The very act of returning represents in a certain way a symbolic 
acknowledgement of the defeat of the Greater Serbian project, which 
was actively or passively supported by a substantial proportion of Serbs 
in Croatia. 
 Security and political conditions for minority return have gradually 
started to improve since the  fi rst left- center coalition came to power 
in 2000. Such a policy was continued by the new government of the 
 reformed HDZ at the end of 2003, which, moreover, included the 
Independent Democratic Serb Party (Samostalna demokratska srp-
ska stranka –  SDSS) as political representatives of  Serbs in Croatia in 
the  coalition governement. However, the potential for Serb return was 
mainly exhausted by then, it seems. 
 Changes in the political regime were accompanied by the reorgani-
zation of the institutional structure of public administration and public 
services. Perhaps the most important novelty for (potential)  returnees 
concerns local and  regional self- government. Considering only six coun-
ties (districts) with high portions of Serb population before the war, the 
number of cities and municipalities increased, specifi cally, from about 
30 to 117. This means that today the majority of the population actu-
ally lives in local government units that had not existed as such before 
1991. Renaming some settlements as well as certain administrative units 
should also be taken into consideration here. In 1993, regional self- 
government, consisting of twenty counties (districts), was introduced 
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into the administrative system of the Republic of Croatia, which was 
a new level of power not known in Socialist Yugoslavia. In addition to 
the system of local and  regional self- governments, other institutions of 
public administration experienced major or minor changes, both in their 
names and in the distribution of authority and responsibility. For the 
purposes of our discussion, it is important to emphasize that for  Serb 
returnees this resulted in their “institutional illiteracy,” that is a sense of 
“foreignness” in a once familiar institutional environment, which makes 
the already burdensome post- return adjustment even more diffi cult 
for them. 
  New Economic System 
 In its economic sphere Croatia has experienced a transformation from 
a (self- managed) socialist system to a capitalist market economy. Job 
security used to be practically guaranteed, i.e., it was hardly possible 
for a worker or an employee to be fi red even when he or she violated 
labor rules. Nowadays working people fi nd themselves overnight “on the 
street” due to the collapse and/ or privatization of state companies. These 
fi rms in the best- case scenario end up being “restructured” (read: a large 
proportion of employees are made “redundant”), and in the worst- case 
scenario (for the workers) end up in bankruptcy. While “self- managers” 
were involved in the management of “their” companies (through work-
ers’ councils), and were encouraged by the socialist system to con-
sider themselves equal with the management regarding the disposal of 
the company’s assets and resources, now they are (again) reduced to 
mere “wage laborers” whose effi ciency is being determined solely by 
the management. The workers are “accountable” to company owners, 
i.e., shareholders. Social (state) companies no longer provide fl ats for 
their employees, but banks (now mostly foreign- owned) offer housing 
and other loans, and spur consumer aspirations through which they trick 
masses of people, who are not used to the relentless money market, into 
“debt bondage.” Even though  Serb refugees were able to see similar, 
although somewhat slower, changes in the countries where they sought 
refuge (mainly Serbia and Bosnia- Herzegovina), these further reinforce 
the impression of “foreignness” of the context of return. 
 For almost fi ve years the areas from which the majority of Serbs had 
escaped were politically unrecognized and economically isolated from 
the rest of Croatia and the world, which only accelerated the decline of 
manufacturing, trading, and handicrafts companies that had operated 
there until the outbreak of the confl ict. Firms in the war zones which 
remained under the control of Croatian authorities faced a similar fate. 
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Thus, by the end of the war, numerous jobs which had provided employ-
ment opportunities for the local population had been abolished. 
 Upon inclusion of these areas in the constitutional and legal order of 
the Republic of Croatia, indeed some new but still few jobs were created 
in new private (or privatized) companies. As a rare positive example, we 
should emphasize that some  Serb returnees succeeded in developing and 
modernizing their farms. 51 “Old” jobs were kept mainly in state and local 
government (police and administration), and public services (education, 
health) and state- owned companies (railways, postal services). In addi-
tion to a generally low job supply, we might suspect that the remaining 
 ethnic Serbs in Croatia and even more so Serb returnees could not get a 
job on equal terms with Croat job- seekers. Furthermore, the terminology 
and the symbolic meaning of public institutions have changed. Thus, the 
active workplace environment also became “foreign” to  Serb returnees. 
This is why labor- market  inactive returnees returned more easily to the 
villages. Relying on their pensions and the help of other family members 
who remained in the country of refuge or who moved to a third country 
(refugee transnational survival strategy), and small- scale agriculture on 
their land, they can survive in the harsh conditions of the return. 52 
  Cultural, Linguistic, and Symbolic Changes 
 The period following the declaration of Croatian independence is also 
associated with signifi cant changes in political symbols and cultural ico-
nography. A stronger emphasis was placed on symbols that were present 
even before, such as the shield- shaped red and white checkerboard, or the 
anthem  Lijepa Naša . At the same time the iconography, which had been 
repressed until then, entered the public space, for example the Croatian 
wattle. School textbooks and the media (re)affi rmed certain prominent 
fi gures and events in  Croatian history, thus constructing a new cultural 
tradition which is usually accompanied by profound political shifts in 
a country. Croatian kings, dukes and bans, and great national fi gures 
(such as  Ante Starc \evic 8), in new conjuction with local Christian saints 
and church offi cials, took up the public scene, while Partisan fi gures and 
anti- fascist iconography disappeared from it. Even the (previously cher-
ished) Croatian Peasants’ Revolt against the tyranny of the foreign feu-
dalist (Franjo Tahy) hardly fi ts any more into this retraditionalization of 
the  Croatian national state. Something similar can be found in literature 
and art, in which some authors and artists lost their dominant role in the 
public sphere, while others took their place. 
 National cultural “purists” have, in particular, made sure to “cleanse” 
the language, resorting to forgotten archaic Croatian expressions, 
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artifi cially coined words used in the NDH, and newly coined words, in 
order to expel “foreign words,” but also to free the standard Croatian 
(offi cial) language from any admixture of the  Serbian language. This 
cultural project of “exercising discipline” over language could not avoid 
caricature exaggeration, which has been mocked by the liberal cul-
tural public, while more importantly a great portion of the “new- old- 
Croatian expressions” are simply not accepted in the language practices 
of Croatian language speakers. 
 Although partially successful, the language “reform”  affected Serb 
returnees, who have become linguistically distinctive or incompetent in 
the renewed Croatian language.  Serbs in  Croatia considered standard 
Croatian, justifi ably, their language (which was then called Croato- Serb, 
i.e., the Serbo- Croatian language). The creators of modern languages in the 
Illyrian national movement, which aimed to have one standard language 
for  Croats and Serbs in Austro- Hungary, took the Ijekavian Štokavian dia-
lect, spoken by a part of Croats and Serbs, not only in Croatia but also in 
Bosnia- Herzegovina, as the standard variant of the language.  Ethnic Serb 
writers in Croatia used standard Croatian in their writing. However, even 
then, many Croats used regional dialects in their spoken language, as they 
do today, but Serbs in Croatia did not, especially in the area of Banovina. 
Anyway, this language was different from the Štokavian Ekavian language 
standard in Serbia, which was and has remained  Serbian. 53 
 Serbs in Croatia traditionally have not used Serbian language stan-
dards, now exclusively called Serbian. Thus, they now fi nd themselves 
facing the decision as to whether to be acknowledged as speakers of 
the  Croatian or of the Serbian language. In the fi rst case  – not being 
a language community – there is no reason for them to have their own 
schools, taught in  Serbian. In the second – adopting  Serbian language 
standards  – they make themselves a linguistically “visible” minority. 
Interestingly enough, only about a quarter of the existing Serb popu-
lation in Croatia (at the time of the 1991 census) selected the second 
option (some 50,000 people, making up 1.01 percent of the population). 
A negligible margin (at the same time) tried to pretend that a hyphenated 
language option still exists, i.e., by choosing the variants Serbo- Croatian 
(0.11 percent) or Croato- Serb (0.05 percent of the population). 54 While 
living for years in exile, mostly in Serbia and the  Republic of Serbska 
(Republika Srpska),  Serb refugees from Croatia had to adapt to the 
Serbian Ekavian standard, which after their return only increased and 
emphasized their linguistic distinctiveness. In short, due to the language 
policy of the new Croatian government as well as new language habits 
acquired during exile,  Croatian Serbs have become a visible language 
minority, which was not the case before the confl ict. 
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  Conclusion 
 Recent critical literature as well as our own research has challenged 
the traditional notion of refugee return, in particular minority refugee 
return. It has been confi rmed that in a  post- confl ict society, return is not 
a single act, and it does not help  minority refugees to reintegrate into the 
home and homeland they had to leave. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
a large proportion of  refugees (primarily young, educated, urban people 
with children) do not opt for return as a durable solution, regardless of 
whether, in the country of their origin, physical and political security as 
well as fundamental human and returnee rights have been established. 
By approaching the issue strategically and rationally,  minority refugees 
become aware of thorough transformations in the country of their ori-
gin and in the immediate vicinity of their homes. Scientists have begun 
discovering that, and we hope that international creators of refugee and 
returnee policies will start acknowledging it as well. 
 In this chapter we have tried to identify some key political, economic, 
socio- demographic, cultural, and symbolic changes in the case of Republic 
of  Croatia, which more or less affect the lives of  Serb minority returnees 
and the (un)willingness of many  Serb refugees to return. Finally, one 
should not forget that in the years they spent in exile, refugees themselves 
underwent changes on a personal, family, and social level. Although 
most of them fl ed to Serbia and the  Republic of Serbska, many were not 
accepted with open arms and welcomed as they had expected, and they 
had to adapt to new environments, which were for them “foreign” even 
though they belonged to the same nation. It can be assumed that many 
 refugees ( returnees) have experienced changes in their own lives, fam-
ily situations, and eventually life aspirations. This particularly applies to 
younger generations and those who left small, rural, and remote settle-
ments. Most of them migrated from small rural villages to larger and 
urban settlements. 55 This change has certainly infl uenced the expecta-
tions and aspirations of people in terms of infrastructure standards, the 
availability of cultural and entertainment facilities, housing quality, and 
professional opportunities. Such persons can now, from a different per-
spective, evaluate their pre- war settlement and the area they left, which 
do not even provide opportunities for the life that existed before the war, 
let alone offer attractive prospects for development. 
 The same changes furthermore account for the negative selection of 
 returnees in terms of their age, economic activity, education, lifestyle, 
and housing. The decision to return by elderly, rural, economically  inac-
tive minority refugees in retirement, with some land to farm mainly for 
their own needs, is as rational as is the decision of many young, educated, 
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 urban minority refugees with children (integrated in the new environ-
ment) to remain in the country where they took refuge, or in a third 
country. Actually, the decision is often made at the level of the (wider) 
family, and includes a transnational family strategy, with a division of 
roles. In this division, the elderly return to rebuild homes and farms, and 
keep them for their children and grandchildren, while the younger, if they 
can, provide fi nancial support for their parents and grandparents who 
have returned, and occasionally visit the rebuilt refugee homes for family 
gatherings. In this way, they ensure the option of their “return” over the 
long term, when favorable conditions are met. In any case, restitution of 
land, houses, and fl ats remains an important material capital, which can 
be used for future life options by the inheritors. In short, we have tried 
to suggest that minority (Serb) refugee return to a  post- confl ict society 
(such as Croatian) can actually be better understood and explained as a 
practically new immigration, instead of simply as reintegration into the 
 society of origin. 
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